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Abstract:  
Pessimists would rather declare the Islamic finance industry as clinically 
dead. Such dim expectation would be a reality when the industry will completely 
switch to selling present for future money through contrived sale contracts. The 
writings are plenty on the wall. We need to listen and respond seriously. Calling 
for the reform of the industry could be the last attempt to save it. Hassan’s paper 
(2020) provides a good perspective of the current problem, albeit dispassionate.  
This comment provides a brief explanation of the theoretical rationale and 
the macroeconomic benefits of Islamic finance. It diagnoses the problem of 
Islamic finance as that of convergence. Moreover, it makes few modest proposals 
are presented to mitigate the problem. 
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:صلختسملا 
لا الضفي   مي ذموملشتملا ش مالا رظن أ  ذن نألاق قمي ي لم  ر   فو  دقلملاا اي متلا أ  ا الني أ  أ موملشتم
   ند قلذ  ر مدفختلسد مذلةنتلسملا   نالمي ذلمألا   نالا   ي  لإ مدمم   دقلملاا اي متلا ل أ  مد اذإ قنأت  أ 
 أ  ماي رفجي ممد مأارفجلا  لد ش نمظ تميمت لاق قذناطصد ع  ي حقصلا ش دفلمر قفجي مهند ادمفتنق تصان
(  سح ذورق مفن ق قمنذمننلا   خلأا ءافالا  ن ذ دقملاا ذ لمملا ذدماصلا2020 ذ ضنلا رظهل لا نند ار ص  )
قانمستلا  د رفو  لد أمك أإق مش صمنملا 
صخليق  ق لنتلا اظن ق دقلللللملاا اي متلل ذ ل لا ذي ملللللصتولاا  رماملاق ذي مالا تار ةملا ذل لللللشد صخلللللش ق
 تمللح تنملا ني ق لنتلا مفللنيق قضفلل لنتلا اللي متلا  د فلليايتملا  رمللنتلا  ر بللقر تي م دقللللللملاا اللي متلا
قذل شملا رظن ذهجا مل ذنضا تملا 
 ذيمو لا مذ مملااق ذ ن نألا تقدمنملا مذيفنالا ذي مالا م دقملاا اي متلا م دقملاا  مصتولاا :ذلافلا تممل لا
 اي متلا  لدق دقملاا 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical rationale of Islamic finance 
A rather basic but difficult question is whether there is justification for the 
conventional system, which is interest-based. Böhm-Bawerk (1890) justified 
interest by the presence of time preference as well as the time involved in the 
production. While Böhm-Bawerk's theory has been used by Irving Fisher (1908) 
to construct a theory of intertemporal choice, and later by Keynes (1936) as well 
as the neoclassics in their theories of interest, we take a strong exception in its 
basic premise. To justify a premium between the present and future 
consumption of a commodity, based on both factors, cannot be automatically 
used to justify a premium between the present and future money. Intuitively, 
each individual has a different rate of time preference for each commodity. 
Besides, the contribution of a commodity in production would differ from one 
individual and one commodity to another.  
Market prices hardly reflect the rates of time preference for commodities. 
We can find highly expensive commodities with low rates of time preference and 
vice versa. Moreover, the size of productive contribution per unit of a commodity 
would differ from one individual to another. It even differs for the same 
individual, from one use to another. Therefore, aggregating a set of 
heterogeneous commodities, using their prices or even their contribution to 
production as weights would not yield a meaningful aggregate to compare over 
time. In other words, there is no way we can discover a single rate of time 
preference to be used for the intertemporal allocation of such a group of 
commodities for a single individual. The same is true for a group of individuals. 
To hypothesize a rate of time preference aggregated both over individuals 
as well as commodities and attach it to a quantity of money, as representing 
commodities is therefore faulty. Even if we were to consider money as an asset, 
we cannot claim that the relationship between present and future money 
measures the same between the present and future goods. This is exactly what 
the neoclassical theory of the rate of interest, based on loanable funds and 
Keynes liquidity preference has done. The common mistake is to assume a well-
defined mapping from a set of commodities, each with a unique rate of time 
preference ununiformly used by a set of individuals to a monetary aggregate. To 
do so, the heroic assumption regarding commodity homogeneity and individuals 
preference similarity must be swallowed. 
We conclude that there is no market rate of interest, no matter which 
theory of interest you believe in. The rate of interest found in an economy is 
merely an administrative price, which is set by the central bank, or a club of 
banks (as in Libor) and imposed on the economy as a part of the conventional 
banking and finance system.    
Samuelson (1958) and then Friedman (1969) argued that a positive rate of 
interest places a cost on using money in transactions, leading people to 
economize on the use of money, by substituting real resources for money in 
transactions, thereby, reducing total output and efficiency. 
Friedman proposes reducing the nominal interest rate to zero, by deflating 
the economy at a rate equal to the real rate of interest. Ignoring the practical 
difficulties in implementing Friedman’s rule, in many ways, it exonerates the 
concept of avoiding the use of the rate of interest in finance as espoused by 
Islamic finance. Islamic finance removes the Samuelson-Friedman inefficiency 
by introducing a creative institutional arrangement to flush out interest from the 
system. Indeed, to establish an Islamic finance industry without being integrated 
into an Islamic monetary and financial system, along the lines proposed by Al-
Jarhi (1981) would take it out of context. 
The application of the Islamic finance paradigm must be associated with 
allowing only real and semi-real transactions and strictly prohibiting nominal 
transactions (Al-Jarhi, 2002), which include money (spot or deferred) against 
commodities (deferred or spot) as well as spot transactions in foreign exchange, 
respectively. Meanwhile, nominal transactions or spot money against deferred 
money or a result of a gamble as well as all futures transactions would be 
prohibited. Contemporary Islamic banking indulges in debt and pure risk trading 
which are all nominal transactions. While real and semi-real transactions 
improve the market mechanism and have positive effects on real income, the 
effects of nominal transactions could be detrimental (Al-Jarhi, 2002). 
There are other gains from Islamic finance, in addition to its being free of 
the Samuelson-Friedman inefficiency, including more efficient resource 
allocation, based on investment profitability in cases of partnership finance and 
directly tying the cost of finance to the value in use in cases of sale finance (Al-
Jarhi 2017). Further benefits include stability at both the firm and the 
macroeconomic level, the advantage of working as universal banks, including 
mitigating the risks associated with asymmetric information, the higher 
capability of fund mobilization, the greater resilience in the face of external 
shocks, more systemic integrity, the higher potential of reaching equitable 
redistribution, and the greater debt sustainability. Indeed, an Islamic economic 
system represents a reform agenda for the world economic order.  
The convergence of Islamic finance to conventional finance  
According to Majeed and Abida (2017), Widigdo et al (2016) and Red et al 
(2015), Islamic bank employees have a favorable perception of their industry, but 
the public has mixed opinions about the Islamic finance industry. Latiff et al 
(2015) identify inadequacies of the industry as inclination to debt-based 
financing modes, misunderstanding of the nature of its products, customers’ 
doubts about its Shari'ah compliance, lack of product innovations, and low 
service quality. 
Azmata et al (2015) find empirical evidence that conventional structures 
are crowding out the Islamic financial structures, leading to little structural 
differences between conventional and Islamic products. Ahmed et al (2014) find 
no significant difference between finance pricing of Islamic banks and 
conventional banks, confirming strong similarity.  
There are indications that Islamic banks have been indulging in nominal 
transactions at an increasing rate, i.e., mimicking conventional finance while 
striving to camouflage the conventional nature of their products. Such 
convergence to conventional finance is surprising, considering that Islamic 
finance has a solid theoretical rationale as well as significant macroeconomic 
advantages. The question is why. This presents an irony to explain. The reason 
is twofold. First, the advantages of Islamic finance could be diminished, because 
its institutions are not supported by an Islamic economic system. Second, the 
advantages of Islamic finance are mostly of a macroeconomic type that cannot 
be internalized by Islamic banks. 
Why Shari'ah governance is ineffective  
Shari'ah governance of Islamic finance varies widely in degrees of 
sophistication. Some countries have rudimentary arrangements while others, 
like Malaysia in particular have a very sophisticated system of Shari'ah 
governance. However, we find that the convergence of Islamic to conventional 
finance is present in both types of countries. This must be explained. 
The first and most important aspect of this dilemma lies in the 
qualifications of the members of Shari'ah boards. It cannot be denied that bank 
operations require specialization in financial and monetary economics. yet, we 
can hardly find one economist as a member of Shari'ah boards. This charges 
Shari'ah scholars who are members with a function they cannot possibly 
perform, due to their specialization. It would be more conceivable to have 
Shari'ah boards with a majority of members that are qualified in monetary and 
financial economics, while one member would be specialized in Shari'ah. 
Needless to say, some of the Shari'ah board members may not have sufficient 
qualifications in Shari'ah. Worse yet, some members hold seats in numerous 
boards, indicating a conflict of interest as well as insufficient time to focus on 
business. 
Any Shari'ah scholar would agree that transactions require both formal 
validities as well as the validity of purpose, which reflects their compliance with 
Maqassed. Because of their education and training, Shari'ah scholars focus on 
formal validity, ignoring the other component, which can only be ascertained by 
properly trained economists. Recomposing Shari'ah boards to be dominated by 
economists would hopefully remedy this problem. 
Second, the most important stakeholders in Islamic banking, namely 
investment account holders are absent from the decision-making process. Not 
only that they provide the lion’s share of Islamic banks’ resources, they are the 
first to be adversely affected by non-Shari'ah compliance (Al-Jarhi, 2018)1. It is 
probably about time to remedy this by recomposing bank boards of directors to 
include proportional representation of this group, which presumably would be 
interested in applying the Islamic finance paradigm. 
                                                             
1 When an Islamic bank mimics conventional finance, it earns the current rate of interest, which 
is presumably below the profit rate on investment. Investment account holders would suffer, 
while shareholders would stand to earn Mudareb fees that supplement their return on capital. 
Other Challenges  
One of the common challenges of Islamic finance arises when an Islamic 
bank is a subsidiary of a conventional financial institution, which is an obvious 
conflict of interest. Another challenge arises with Sukuk which have been 
securitized along the lines of asset-backed bonds, sometimes through the 
purchase of assets from an originator, then leasing them back to him without 
“real sale”. Generally, Sukuk holders have no property rights over securitized 
assets.  
Another challenge lies in the classification of companies according to their 
Shari'ah compliance, for equity investment. The questionable criterion 
commonly adopted for the dominance of Shari'ah-compliant assets (one-third) 
has no Shari'ah justification whatsoever 2 . Besides, Islamic banks are 
automatically classified as Shari'ah compliant, regardless of the composition of 
their assets. 
Perhaps the most serious of all challenges is the inactive role assumed by 
central banks, especially their staying aloof from Shari'ah compliance. The 
central banking, commercial, and financial market laws are more often than not 
devoid of any reference to the principles of Islamic finance. Central banks cannot 
claim Shari’ah neutrality while providing licenses to supposedly Shari'ah-
compliant Islamic banks. Monetary authorities, must ensure that such banks 
do not violate their licenses, and even nullifies the license of any violator. 
 
Monetary policy & Islamic finance  
Monetary authorities are almost unanimous in treating Islamic and 
conventional banks similarly from the regulatory vantage point. This has entailed 
focusing on financial viability while ignoring investment viability and Shari'ah 
compliance. The regulatory perception redefines the Islamic finance paradigm as 
void of investment with almost no concern for the Shari'ah-compliance side. The 
central banking approach to Islamic finance regulation must be reformed. 
First, the regulatory authority must consider the propriety of Islamic 
banks operations from the banking, investment as well as Shari'ah conformity 
sides as integral parts of Islamic banking. Shying away from the last two aspects 
has allowed Islamic banks to drift away to the conventional side. 
Second, Islamic banks are totally excluded from the concerns of monetary 
policy. To exclude the Islamic finance sector form monetary policy considerations 
is rather extreme, especially in countries where the share of Islamic finance in 
total assets approaches or exceeds %25. The reason is that financial innovation 
in the money market has been limited to conventional instruments. To remedy 
this, we have for long proposed that the monetary authority apportions the 
money supply into two Islamic and conventional shares. The Islamic share can 
be placed as central (investment) deposits (CDs) with Islamic banks, based on 
Mudaraba. This would be subject to total reserves and should be used to provide 
                                                             
2 It would have been reasonable to adopt 51 percent as a majority rule, or even higher. 
finance in partnership and sale modes (Al-Jarhi, 2018). The central bank can 
direct the sectoral allocation of this finance according to national economic 
priorities.  
In parallel, the central bank should issue a monetary instrument under 
the name of central deposit certificates (CDCs), which would be tradable by 
Islamic banks and the public. Their proceeds would be added to CDs. Monetary 
policy related to the Islamic finance industry would be conducted through open 
market operations in CDCs. The rate of return on CDC’s, or RCDC would be 
market-determined in contrast to the rate of interest (Al-Jarhi, 2018).  
conclusions 
Islamic finance has covered a good distance towards convergence to 
conventional finance, depriving itself of much of its meaning and rationale. Along 
this road the national economy is losing macroeconomic advantages. Shari'ah 
compliance is increasingly becoming a misnomer under which conventional 
finance is boldly practiced. The Islamic finance industry is exposing itself to 
mockery, cynicism, and disillusionment. Solutions must be designed to roll back 
the convergence between the two finance systems to secure the macroeconomic 
benefits that justify the switch from conventional to Islamic finance.  
Despite claims that Islamic finance has a higher cost than conventional 
finance at the microeconomic level (more documentation, roundabout 
procedures), it has a credible theoretical rationale as well as substantial 
macroeconomic advantages. Yet, Islamic bankers and finance officers balk at 
applying the Islamic finance paradigm. Such a paradigm can only be enforced 
through regulation and supervision. This must be accompanied by serious 
reforms in the legal and regulatory environment, in addition to taking bold steps 
to restructure corporate and Shari'ah governance.   
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